Application Service Providers (ASPs) deliver on-demand information processing services to user firms via the Internet. Rapid technological developments in telecommunications in recent years have made ASPs an attractive alternative to purchasing, installing, and maintaining modifiable off-the-shelf (MOTS) software solutions. We study several critical aspects of a user firm's choice between an ASP and MOTS software. The competitive model considers heterogeneous users that differ in terms of their expected transaction volumes and volatility, while ASPs and MOTS vendors differ in terms of their pricing structure, setup cost, system customization ability, integration and service level arrangement. Our results identify and characterize the equilibrium conditions under which ASPs and MOTS vendors can coexist in a competitive market, and they explain which firms could be the primary beneficiaries of each vendor type. Interestingly, we find that the ASP' entry to the market benefits not only its own clients but also the MOTS users, and we explain why despite that, the competitive advantage of the MOTS approach decreases significantly as users' transaction volatility, or business uncertainty, increases. Hence, the value added by ASPs comes as much from the efficient pooling of transaction volatility risks as from the reduction in IT implementation costs. We also look at the competition between MOTS and ASO vendors in a longer time horizon with possible future changes in software quality, and we show when the ASP can take over the whole market, even if its quality is still lower than the MOTS software. Our findings suggest that to stay competitive, ASPs should invest in both improving software quality and in reducing service prices over time. Surprisingly, the opposite also holds, and along with any relative quality decreases, the ASP should raise its prices, providing a relatively an inferior service at a higher charge. This happens because at that case the ASP will serve mainly those firms who are priced out of the MOTS market, and can behave monopolistically at that segment. Finally, our model explains when MOTS software users could be better off despite an increase in transaction volatility in the market, and when they will be less likely to switch to an ASP even as the relative quality of the ASP's applications increases over time. We prove that if they do switch, their primary incentive is abating higher transaction or business volatility risks rather than reducing transactions' costs per se.
Introduction
can reap the benefits of the ASP's economy of scale, access IT expertise, and gain system flexibility (Dunn 2005; Murphy 2005; Singh et al. 2004 ).
ASPs are enjoying prosperous times. According to AMR Research, the on-demand software market is growing more than 20% a year, compared with single-digit growth in traditional software (Lacy 2006) . ASPs are expected to generate $10 billion in annual revenue by 2009, up from $1.5 billion in 2006 (Pallatto 2006 ). An increasing number of software vendors, including industry giants such as IBM, SAP, Oracle, and Microsoft, are moving to such a business model.
For example, IBM is offering "IBM-on-demand," which allows corporate users to acquire IBM's computing power and software applications as a service.
3 Meanwhile, IBM is also providing a package of services and incentives to help other software companies deploy their products as hosted applications (Pallatto 2006) . Oracle is ranked as one of the top ten ASPs. Its online offering, "E-business Suite," has successfully attracted many small companies by charging a low transaction fee. 4 In January 2006, Oracle acquired Seibel, and it now uses its fledgling CRM ondemand software to compete with Salesforce.com, the most successful ASP providing online CRM, which reports 399,000 paying subscribers (Vara 2006) . Bill Gates has proclaimed that the emergence and rise of on-demand software will be the "next sea-change" in computing (Niccolai 2005) . Many observers expect an industry-wide revolution brought on by the ASP model:
"Software as a service is the biggest thing to happen in software in 25 years" (Knorr 2004 ).
For firms in need of enterprise software, the ASP constitutes a viable alternative to the traditional MOTS software solution. As an example, we studied the case of Medical Diagnostic Imaging (MDI), an imaging center conducting about 10,000 studies annually (Martin 2004) . It was looking for a state-of-the-art PACS (Picture Archiving and Communications System) to manage and deliver patients' medical images. MDI looked first at a MOTS solution from such vendors as Cannon, Onyx, and Fusion. All of them would have required MDI to build and 3 See http://www-1.ibm.com/services/ondemand/success.html. 4 See www.oracle.com.
maintain the PACS in-house. The bids from these vendors typically exceeded one million dollars just for the up-front investment in the software. Additionally, MDI identified significant costs associated with installation, customization, ongoing support, upgrades, data security and aroundthe-clock maintenance. MDI determined that an on-site MOTS system was too expensive. To reduce the required initial costs, MDI chose an ASP, MedPACS Display, which provides viewer software for radiologists and physicians, as well as archives, hardware, software, and maintenance. 5 This ASP charges a flat fee of $3.89 per study, including all the necessary ongoing support (Ma 2005) . 6 MDI thus was also relieved of the need to hire and manage an internal IT staff for the radiology department. Moreover, the ASP offers highly scalable processing services.
When MDI faces random fluctuations in patient volume, MedPACS responds accordingly from the remote site that handles most of the clinical data.
Many businesses face a similar decision problem. In a web survey by ThinkStrategies, fully one-third of 118 respondents were already using ASPs, and another third were considering using one within the following 12 months (Kaplan 2005) . A research report from Summit Strategies indicates that small and medium businesses with limited IT resources and constrained budgets are more likely to use such fee-per-transaction applications (Garner 2004) . Some large organizations are attracted to ASPs as well. Amazon.com, Cisco, Sprint, Morgan Stanley, Nokia, and Target are all clients of Salesforce.com (The Economist 2006; Ricadela 2006) . It is clear that ASPs are stealing market share from vendors of MOTS software. On-demand software is a powerful trend, one that is becoming an important disruptive force in the software industry: "It is not the end of software. It is just another way of deploying it" (Shai Agassi, president of SAP's product and technology group).
However, the long-term success of ASPs remains uncertain. In its formative stage, the ASP market is experiencing significant consolidations. The fear that ASPs could fail is a main obstacle 5 See www.medpacs.com. 6 Most ASPs in the healthcare industry charge similarly for their PACS systems. Stentor, for example, offers the image delivery software iSite on a per study basis and charges, on average, $3.50 per delivery.
to the large-scale adoption of ASPs. Data security and reliability as well as application control are always among users' top concerns (Bednarz 2006) . In addition, although there is no doubt that the ASP model does have numerous advantages, the traditional MOTS in-house solution can deliver superb results. The source code of the MOTS software can be modified to meet a user's particular requirements, so the software is well customized and can easily interoperate with the user's existing system components. In contrast, the ASP offers a one-to-many solution, with limited customization. 7 Its product is not tailored to fit an individual user's specific requirements or unique business environment. As a result, the user may need to pay extra to make the ASP's standard software application work smoothly with its existing IT systems. For instance, in the MDI case, getting the various systems to communicate and work together required some effort.
MDI had to run an additional module that "took the output from its own in-house research information system and converted the output into an image file for storage in the archive" (Martin 2004 Little work has been done on the competition between the ASP and MOTS solutions. It is not clear what factors play important roles in users' IT choices. We study a software market in which corporate users have these two IT options for external sourcing. The software vendors are differentiated in the following ways. First, they deliver different products: a customized software application (from the MOTS) versus a bundle of standard software and services (from the ASP).
7 SAP believes that this lack of integration will eventually lead most large corporations that currently are users of online CRM to move back to an in-house system (Hamm 2006) . Second, they adopt distinct pricing modes: an outright purchase (the MOTS) versus a "per transaction" fee structure (the ASP). Third, they employ different delivery methods: software installed on a user's in-house server (the MOTS) versus an interface delivered over the Internet remotely (the ASP). Users therefore have different cost structures and bear different risks in dealing with each vendor type. In practice, choosing and implementing an enterprise software system are highly complex decisions. CIOs need to compare the two options on multiple points, such as setup costs, pricing structure, ability to integrate data, scalability, and service level arrangements. Their decisions involve not only economic but also technological and security issues. We do not attempt to include all the related factors; instead, we study firms' choices by focusing on the economics issues only. In particular, we are interested in estimating the relative economic advantages of using each vendor type. We assume that the users (they are firms) have made the decision to install a computerized information system, aiming to improve internal business processes or to increase value for end customers. The decision investigated in this paper is the choice of delivery channel: obtaining the system through an ASP or MOTS. Strategic adoption behaviors such as herding or delaying adoption for a better system or lower price are ignored.
ASPs and MOTS vendors price their offerings differently. The MOTS vendor sells the software (one-time, fixed-fee pricing), and the ASP rents it (transaction-based pricing). Our work thus is related to research on selling and renting information goods. Most previous work in this literature examines a one-firm setting. Varian (2000) , for example, considers a monopoly firm's choice when both selling and renting are feasible channels. Choudhary et al. (1998) analyze the possibility of a monopoly firm selling and renting a package of software simultaneously, and Sundararajan (2004) compares fixed-fee pricing and usage-based pricing for information goods for a monopoly firm. Fishburn et al. (1997) are among the few who compare selling and renting in a competitive market. They model a repeated competition game in which one firm charges a fixed subscription fee and the other charges based on usage. In their paper, the two sellers' offerings are homogeneous; the only difference between the two sellers is the pricing method.
We, however, study the competition between two vendors that are differentiated in both offerings and pricing structures. We identify several interesting features of such a market.
First, the value added by ASPs comes as much from the efficient pooling of demand uncertainty risks as from the reduction in significant IT implementation costs. Specifically, when the volatility of transactions increases, more users opt for the ASP, and the relative advantage of the ASP approach increases significantly.
Second, we find that the software market may show three different structures. Under fairly broad conditions, the ASP and MOTS solutions will coexist. The market will be segmented in such a way that firms with low transaction volumes opt for the ASP model because of the cheapness and scalability, and firms with high transaction volumes prefer the MOTS model to enjoy software that fits their specific business needs well. Under certain conditions, however, one of the providers is unable to survive, and the software market will be dominated by one business model alone.
Third, our findings suggest that different business models are suited for different types of software applications. In particular, the ASP model works well for software applications such as financial trading, electronic medical records, and payroll systems. These applications typically serve functions with highly volatile demand but a standard process. For complex business software, such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, we still suggest the traditional inhouse model.
We also study the ASP-MOTS competition in a longer time window with potential real-time changes. We obtain surprising yet important findings. If users are concerned about future changes in the business environment, such as hardware upgrades on their side, which decreases the ASP software quality, ASPs should increase their prices. They should "give up" the competition with the MOTS vendor for high-volume users and instead focus on attracting small and medium firms.
If users expect the unfit costs of using standard software to decrease due to the advance of web technologies, which increases the quality of ASP software, ASPs should reduce their prices to compete aggressively with MOTS vendors for large corporate users. These findings help us to suggest useful competitive strategies to providers of on-demand software.
Finally, we show that competition in a longer window gives advantages to the MOTS solution. Once the initial implementation costs are sunk, users only need to pay ongoing maintenance costs. Hence, users of existing in-house systems have little incentive to switch to ondemand software, even if the ASP can promise quality improvement over time. If these users do switch, they do so in order to abate high capacity risks caused by high transaction volatility rather than to reduce operating costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. We analyze the ASP-MOTS competition and identify the key determinants of the future of the ASP business model in Section 3. Section 4 extends the competition analysis over a longer window.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
We first model the market before the ASP appears, and then the market with both vendors.
The Pre-ASP Market
Software application users in our model are firms. Before the ASP, firms get access to software systems by installing them in-house. The MOTS vendor sells the packaged software to its user. The vendor modifies the source code to fit the user's specific business needs, which assures a good integration with the user's existing IT system. The vendor bears an operating cost MOTS C to serve one user and receives a one-time payment P from the user. For brevity, we assume that the MOTS vendor provides only one version of the product and that the licensing fee is not a function of users' transaction volumes. The MOTS vendor can monitor the number of users or installations, but it is difficult to monitor the actual transaction volume, which varies over time. The user must install hardware and IT infrastructures, hire IT staff, and organize an internal IT group to provide software maintenance, data backups, and security and capacity management.
In order to keep these IT resources in-house, the user incurs a variety of costs. Let c denote the service costs associated with each use of the software (i.e., the service costs per transaction).
Users face stochastic workload in terms of the number of transactions using the software. Ex ante, users cannot precisely estimate the actual transaction volume. They therefore determine and install the proper service capacity in-house based on the anticipated transaction volume. If the actual volume is more than the installed capacity, the user faces an insufficient capacity problem and loses some potential utility. If the actual volume is less than the installed capacity, the user faces an overcapacity problem, and it still pays the costs of holding the excess IT capacity. In both cases, the user incurs losses. It bears capacity risks caused by demand uncertainty. 
The Dual Market-The ASP Competes with the MOTS Vendor
In the dual market, users can access software applications through an ASP.
To start doing business with a user, the ASP first moves the user's data to its own server, which costs the ASP a one-time setup cost S. The ASP provides IT services to enable the software use, which costs c per transaction. We assume that the ASP's service capacity is plenty. In reality, most ASPs have established large data centers and strong network infrastructures. They design the service systems with ample capacity as a way of reducing the risk of congestion. ASPs therefore resemble power stations, and users buy software as a service by plugging into the "ASP grid."
The ASP employs a "one to many" business structure. To any individual user, the application offered by the ASP is not well-customized. Each transaction gives the user a total value of u-t.
The parameter t measures the user's disutility from not using its ideal product. In many cases, it also represents the cost of extra effort to make the ASP's product work with the user's existing IT components smoothly. In the rest of the paper, we call t a user's "unfit costs." The user pays a price a p per transaction to the ASP. Figure 2 shows the ASP solution.
Stochastic Transaction Volume
When modeling users, we capture two characteristics. First, they have different IT needs.
Users' IT needs are measured by the expected volume of their use of the software. Some firms may use the software application more frequently (in expectation) than others, and these firms have larger IT needs. Second, each user's actual transaction volume is random.
As seen in Figure . In fact, we make no assumption on the distribution of their transaction volumes. It can be shown that firms with low transaction volumes are "insignificant" because they will be priced out of the market in the pre-ASP scenario (see the Appendix).
We make the following general parameter assumptions:
Assumption 1 imposes an upper bound on the transaction volatility level. Note that the maximum expected transaction volume among all firms is 1, so this upper bound is loose.
Assumption 2 imposes an upper bound on the MOTS vendor's costs for software implementations. If MOTS C exceeds this upper bound, no user will be served by the MOTS vendor in the pre-ASP market, which is a case of no interest.
Analysis and Results

The Pre-ASP Market (the Benchmark Case)
The MOTS vendor determines its optimal price P. Given the price, users make two decisions:
whether to buy the software, and, if so, the proper IT service capacity to install in-house.
We solve the problem backward. Denote the actual transaction volume of user i (located at
D . This user's optimal capacity level, given the software price P and the unit service capacity cost c (i.e., the service cost per transaction c), is obtained by solving
where (.) F is the cumulative density function of the transaction volume for user i. With
, the actual transaction volume will be larger than the user's service , the actual transaction volume will be smaller than the user's service capacity. The user processes all transactions and carries the costs of owning excess capacity. The first two terms in the expression above represent user i's expected utility from using the software; the last two terms represent the user's costs of purchasing the software (P) and costs of establishing in-house IT service capacity ( i cq ). Following Dewan and Mendelson (1990) , we assume a linear function for capacity costs. In practice, capacity costs could be a step function, but a linear function is the best first-order approach for a step function, as Zimmerman (1979) shows.
Solving the optimization problem gives
(
The optimal capacity * i q deviates from the expected transaction volume i d by a factor of
, which may be positive or negative, depending on the relative magnitude of service costs (c) and utility (u). When the transaction becomes volatile (θ increases), the deviation grows.
The expected total utility for user i is
The first term is the expected value from using the software; the second term is the user's one-time payment to the MOTS vendor. The last term represents the user's direct loss due to transaction uncertainty; its magnitude increases with the transaction volatility level (θ ).
Users with non-negative utility choose to purchase the software. The marginal user is at θ u c c u
Thus, the vendor's market share is
, and it obtains a profit of MOTS C P − per user. The selling price P is chosen to maximize the vendor's profit:
Consequently, the indifferent user has an expected transaction volume of
The MOTS vendor leaves most users out of the market. This finding captures the fact that small and medium firms typically have had no access to in-house enterprise software systems, because of the high fixed costs of purchasing, installing, and maintaining such software.
In addition, equation (4) indicates that the MOTS vendor will reduce its price when transaction volatility (θ ) increases. Plugging this optimal price into equation (2) Regardless of the size of the users' application, the fundamental challenge they face is always capacity hedging. Users of MOTS software must set the service capacity in advance based on the anticipated transaction volume; they therefore are unable to quickly scale their capacity up or down according to changing business needs. We show in the next section that ASPs can better address this capacity management problem by pooling the risks of many users.
The Dual Market with Competition
Equilibrium analysis
In the dual market, the ASP and the MOTS vendor simultaneously decide their prices, a p and P . Given the prices, users decide to use one or the other or to stay out of the market.
Consider user i with expected transaction volume
, user i gains an expected utility of
from the ASP, and 
The ASP sets a price a p to maximize its profit:
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It can be shown that the price equilibrium always exists. 8 We are interested in exploring the properties of the price equilibrium, and in examining how the MOTS vendor and users are affected by the ASP's entry into the market. <Proof> See the Appendix.
The unfit cost t, which measures users' disutility (per transaction) from using a lesscustomized software system, plays an important role in the competition. When t is smaller than the given threshold value, a common competition outcome is reached: the ASP's entry into the market has negative effects on its competitor (i.e., the MOTS vendor) and positive effects on users. The ASP benefits users in different ways: users with low transaction volumes, which otherwise will be out of the market, are able to afford the software through the "pay-as-you-go" business scheme; users with medium transaction volumes, which otherwise will install an inhouse system, opt for the ASP because the ASP represents a cheaper solution; users with high transaction volumes stick to the in-house solution but pay less to the MOTS vendor because of the ASP's competition. Therefore, each user is better off, and the total consumer surplus is strictly improved.
However, such effects appear only when * t t ≤ . As Proposition 3 shows, when t increases and exceeds the threshold value * t , the competition exhibits totally different features.
8 To see this, note that equation (8) is the only solution to the ASP's first-order condition. If we plug it into the second-order condition, we get an expression that is always negative. Thus equation (8) gives us the unique profit-maximizing price. Besides, there is no better corner solution: for very low prices, the ASP will take over the entire market, as shown in Proposition 5, and for very high prices, the ASP's profit eventually falls to zero, since the ASP will be driven out of the market, as shown in Proposition 6. We reach the following conclusion: t increase in θ . As the transaction volatility increases, it becomes easier for the ASP to dominate the market, and more difficult for the MOTS vendor to do so.
The Key Determinant(s) of an ASP's Competitive Ability
This subsection summarizes and provides a complete view of the ASP-MOTS competition. We therefore have four competition regimes, as shown in Figure 4 . Our model predicts that in each regime the price competition will occur as follows.
The ASP serves the whole market. All software is delivered by the ASP. In Regimes 1, 2, and 3, full market coverage is achieved, while in Regime 4 (when the MOTS solution dominates), some users remain out of the market.
In different regimes of t, the competition exhibits different features. When t is low, the ASP solution dominates, revealing the possibility of "all software in ASPs." When t is moderate, the ASP shares the market and competes with the MOTS vendor. When t grows further, the ASP loses its competitive advantages and even may not be able to survive. Thus, we conclude:
Proposition 7 As users' unfit costs from using a not fully customized system decrease, the ASP's ability to compete increases monotonically.
It is an interesting but not straightforward conclusion. To some extent, our model resembles the duopoly competition model with vertically differentiated products, with the ASP as the lowquality provider and the MOTS as the high-quality provider. The unfit cost t measures the quality difference between the MOTS and ASP products. In the vertical differentiation model, when the quality difference decreases, the low-quality provider initially gets better off because its product becomes more attractive. But it gets worse off as the quality difference decreases further, because the competition becomes more intensive and eventually hurts both vendors. However, in our paper, we find that reducing the value of t benefits the low-quality provider (i.e., the ASP) monotonically. Moreover, when the two vendors' products are close enough, the high-quality provider (i.e., the MOTS vendor) could be squeezed out of the market. Our findings deviate from traditional vertical differentiation literature because the ASP and the MOTS vendors use different pricing strategies. What we find here is more like what Varian (2000) showed in a monopoly setting: when the quality difference between selling and renting a product is small enough, the renting strategy dominates. We show that a similar conclusion holds in duopoly competition.
This result is very important and provides useful managerial implications. It tells us that
ASPs must offer software applications with a lower value of t in order to survive and succeed in the competitive marketplace. Therefore, not every software application can be delivered through an ASP. The on-demand business model is not simply a new distribution channel for existing software; instead, it requires a fundamentally new set of products and technology architectures. . As we have shown above, the ASP's entry into the market not only allows its own clients to "go on demand" and therefore shift away their uncertainty risks, but it also helps users of the MOTS software to abate their losses caused by demand uncertainty. The ASP business arrangement is appreciated by users to a large extent because it offers highly scalable systems.
Users can promptly scale their capacity up or down at no additional cost, because there is no fixed IT investment made on the users' side.
Moreover, when it becomes expensive to provide on-site IT support services (a large value of c), user firms will find the ASP solution more attractive. As is shown by , when users face a large c, they prefer to get their IT support services from an outside provider, rather than install a system and maintain it
internally. In such a situation, the ASP is expected to take a significant market share.
Robustness Check
Although we make some simplifying assumptions to reduce the complexity of the analyses, our results are robust to these assumptions. For example, we assume that the MOTS software is highly customized, while the ASP tends to come up with much higher unfit costs because of its one-to-many structure. Such an assumption does not imply that the MOTS product must be a perfectly fit system. In practice, an in-house software system could also impose lack-of-fit costs on users. All that matters for modeling purpose is the marginal disutility for users between the MOTS solution and the ASP. In fact, our model addresses the case in which the MOTS software has unusually high unfit costs, i.e., 0 < t . This leads to the trivial outcome that the ASP dominates the marketplace.
In addition, we assume that both vendors use basic pricing strategies: the ASP charges a fee per transaction, and the MOTS vendor requires an outright purchase of the system. Admittedly, there are numerous combinations of pricing strategies in the competitive environment.
Practically, nonlinear pricing can be considered.
9 Since our objective is to characterize the nature of the competition between the ASP and the MOTS vendor, we focus on the most salient differences between the two delivery channels. Assuming complex pricing strategies will not discredit our findings here. 
As shown in Figure 5a , the user 1 d , which is indifferent between the two solutions in the first stage, gains the same total utility. If it chooses the ASP and switches to the MOTS software later on, its total utility is { }
. If it chooses the MOTS software initially, its total utility is
. Note that once the user installs the MOTS system in the first stage, it owns the system and only needs to pay ongoing maintenance costs in the later stage. By equating these two utilities, we get ) (
Equations (9) and (10) imply that the MOTS vendor's price P only affects
When the MOTS vendor's price increases, all else being equal, the number of users that choose the in-house system in the first stage remains unchanged. This is because the price P is cancelled out in the indifferent user 1 d 's utility function (equation (10)). In the second stage, however, the number of switchers (from the ASP to the MOTS solution) decreases as P increases. A high MOTS software price, representing the large up-front costs of an internal system, reduces existing ASP users' incentive to move the software in-house. Its profit comes from users' one-time payment. The optimal price is given by
The profit from users' every use of the software. The optimal price is given by (7)).
This means that the MOTS vendor in practice will adopt a simple pricing strategy and price its software as if it were in a one-stage competition with invariant unfit costs. Finally, we conclude that a belief that unfit costs will increase benefits in-house solution providers but hurts ASPs. Figure 5b shows the two-stage competition when t decreases. In the first stage, with unfit Users choose the MOTS software initially and stay with it afterward.
The Two-Stage Model with Decreased Unfit Costs
As Figure 5b shows, the user 1 d is indifferent between the two solutions at the first stage. If it chooses the MOTS and then switches to the ASP later on, its total utility is
If it chooses the ASP initially, its total utility is 
Equations (13) and (14) show that the MOTS price P only affects 1 d but not S d . When the MOTS price increases, all else equal, the number of users that choose the in-house system in the first stage decreases. However, the number of switchers (from the MOTS to ASP, in the second stage) is not affected by the price increase. A high price for the MOTS software does not give existing users a greater incentive to switch to on-demand software because it is considered a sunk cost.
The MOTS vendor and the ASP choose the following profit-maximizing prices, respectively: <Proof> See the Appendix.
Proposition 9 states three important findings. First, the ASP's response to users' anticipation of decreased unfit costs is to reduce its price, despite an increase in the quality of its product, in order to compete for the more profitable high-volume users.
12 Second, the MOTS vendor once again sticks with a simple pricing strategy. Its best response function conclude that once an in-house system has been installed, users have little incentive to switch to an ASP unless they need to manage high capacity risks.
Discussion and Conclusion
We examine firms' choices between the ASP and MOTS solutions when they face stochastic demand for the software. Our findings show that the ASP on-demand model is superior when the user faces a low transaction volume, high transaction volatility, or expensive in-house IT services, or when the user's unfit costs from using the ASP's standardized product are low. Under broad market conditions, the ASP and MOTS business models will coexist, so it is likely that the software industry will not be dominated by just one. The ASP's entry, at the expense of the traditional MOTS vendor, may benefit every user firm. It offers small and medium firms costsaving access to software, competitively reduces large firms' implementation costs, and mitigates each firm's transaction uncertainty risks. Although the ASP model has several advantages, its long-run viability largely depends on the magnitude of users' unfit costs. As such costs increase, the ASP's ability to compete with the MOTS vendor monotonically decreases. This important finding implies that the ASP model requires a fundamentally new set of products and technology architectures. To achieve profits, the new generation of ASPs should leverage an open language, a proper modular structure, and a loosely coupled interface with other applications, and thus offer products with low unfit costs. Today's ASPs are developing and delivering their own applications using pure Web architectures, in a standard XML language, and in discrete units, which will greatly increase their chance of success. Our work provides a theoretical base for these strategic moves.
ASPs are actively investing in reducing users' unfit costs. It is interesting and necessary to analyze the price competition over a longer horizon in which users' unfit costs may change over time. Our findings suggest that investments in improving ASP software quality should be accompanied with a downward price adjustment. In the future, we expect to see that ASPs offer better products at lower prices. On the other hand, MOTS vendors should always adopt a simple pricing strategy: they should price their software as if they were involved in a static competition with invariant unfit costs. Hence, we predict that no price change will be observed for traditional packaged software. In addition, our analysis shows that existing MOTS software users switch to the ASP solution only to eliminate capacity, or business volume risks rather than to reduce operating costs. These results have direct implications for the kind of businesses that ASP will target in the future.
There are many possibilities for further ASP studies. It would be interesting to examine the role of the Service Level Agreement (SLA). When users have demand for different levels of IT service, the SLA constitutes a way to segment the market and improve the ASP's profit, and maybe to increase users' surpluses as well. Another possible research topic is the software vendor's choice. Some major software companies have changed their business models to operate as an ASP as well. For example, Oracle now has more than 400 customers using its ASP products and a growing share of its revenues from its ASP unit. It is interesting to see that many software providers are doing business both ways: selling a sophisticated version as a MOTS 
. The profit function is concave, and the Compare the MOTS vendor's best response function in the dual market (equation (7)) with its optimal price M P in the pre-ASP market (equation (4) The ASP's entry into the market benefits these firms as well, although they are not its clients.
Each user therefore is better off, and the total consumer surplus is strictly improved.
Q.E.D.
<Proof of Proposition 3> When * t t > , the ASP's unrestricted optimal price (from equation (8) . Since the ASP's price decreases, the MOTS vendor's price will also decrease (using the MOTS vendor's BRF); i.e., 
i This boundary condition may be reached when the unfit cost t is very small. As t decreases, the price from equation (8) also decreases. It may reach a level that is not high enough to make the ASP profitable, especially when the setup cost S is large. In this case, the ASP's best response price will not be the price given by equation (8), which is analyzed in Proposition 6. ii When the ASP serves the whole market, the minimum price required to cover the ASP's setup costs is c S + 2 . Since 
